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1. Introduction 
The book by Freeman and Medoff (1984) on the impacts of labour unions generated 
a significant amount of interest to examine the effects of unions on innovation. Looking at 
the US firms, Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch and Link (1987), Acs and Audretsch (1987, 
1988), and Audretsch and Schulenburg (1990) show that there is a negative influence of 
unions on innovation. Hirsch (1992) shows that most US studies find a negative relation 
between union power and innovation. Using COMPUSTAT data, Bronas and Deere (1993) 
show that there is a significant negative relation between firm-specific unionisation rate and 
innovation. Using mainly aggregative industry level data, Ulph and Ulph (1989) find a 
negative relation for the high-tech industries in England, while Addison and Wagner (1994) 
find a positive but insignificant relation. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) show 
strong negative effects of unions on innovation in North America, while that is generally 
not the case in the UK. Using the industry-level data from Germany, Schnabel and Wagner 
(1994) show that there is no statistically significant negative influence of unions on 
innovation. Addison et al. (2001) also use data from Germany and show that works 
councils are associated with higher wages but no reduction in innovation. There are other 
studies showing no significant effects of unions on innovation (Schnabel and Wagner, 
1992, focusing on manufacturing industries in West Germany, Machin and Wadhwani, 
1991 and Menezes-Filho et al., 1998, focusing on the UK firms and Betcherman, 1991, 
considering Canadian data). 
 The theoretical analysis by Grout (1984) shows that an increase in union power 
creates a negative impact on innovation due to the ‘hold-up’ problem. However, Ulph and 
Ulph (1989, 1994 and 1998) show that whether the hold-up problem remains in an oligopoly 
with strategic R&D competition may depend on the type of bargaining. If there is ex-post 
(short-term) bargaining, which does not involve R&D investment, an increase in union 
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power reduces the R&D investment if the bargaining is over wages only, i.e., if there is a 
right-to-manage model of firm-union bargaining.1 However, if bargaining occurs on wages 
and employment, i.e., if there is an efficient bargaining, an increase in union power increases 
the R&D investment if the unions are weak and they are relatively risk averse. If there is ex-
ante (long-term) bargaining, where bargaining occurs on R&D investment, wage and 
employment, an increase in union power increases (decreases) the R&D investment if a 
successful innovation increases (decreases) employment.2 
While the extant theoretical literature provides important insights into the relation 
between union power and innovation, the result that an increase in union power always 
reduces innovation under ex-post right-to-manage firm-union bargaining cannot explain the 
empirically observed ambiguous effects of union power on innovation. By considering only 
in-house production by the firm, this literature ignores subcontracting or outsourcing of 
production, which is an important empirical regularity in today’s world.3 We show in this 
paper that the possibility of both in-house production and subcontracting can explain the 
ambiguous effects of union power on innovation under ex-post right-to-manage firm-union 
bargaining. 
It is often found that firms in the South Asian and Latin American countries 
undertake formal in-house production and subcontract to the informal sector (WTO-ILO, 
2009 and Ulyssea, 2010). As per Agenor (1996), 60-70% of the total manufacturing 
employment in the developing world is in the informal sector. Evidence on informal 
                                                 
1 In a right-to-manage model, firms and unions bargain over wages and the firms hire workers as per their 
need. On the other hand, in an efficient bargaining model, firms and unions bargain over wages and 
employment. 
2 See, Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) for an excellent survey of this literature. 
3 As per the recent estimate provided jointly by ILO and WTO (WTO-ILO, 2009), the informality increases 
from 50.1% in early 1990s to 52.8% in late 1990s and then changes to 52.2% in early 2000s in Latin 
American economies. In Africa, this increases initially from 60.9% in early 1990s to 63.6% in late 1990s and 
then reduces to 55.7% in early 2000s. On the other hand, Asia accounts for higher informality and it was 
78.3% in early 1990s and drops to 68.5% in late 1990s in Asia. After that, it increases to 78.2% and goes to 
the level that was in the early 1990s. Evidences on in-house production and outsourcing to the global economy 
can be found in Cohen and Young (2006). 
 3 
production can also be found in Schneider and Enste (2000), Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 
(2006) and Mehrotra and Biggeri (2007), to name a few. 
For example, a significant amount of subcontracting to the informal sector by the 
formal sector producers occurs in India. As per Sahu (2010) and Kotwal et al. (2011), 
subcontracting activities increased significantly in India after the economic reforms in 
1999. Mukim (2011) mentions that informal sector in India produces intermediate goods 
and processed exports and import substitutes for the formal sector producers. Ramaswamy 
(1999) analyses subcontracting intensity of Indian manufacturing enterprises between 1970 
and early 1990s. Moreno-Monroy et al. (2014) do a more recent study on subcontracting by 
Indian manufacturing enterprises over 1995-2006. They mention that “… formal enterprises 
wishing to reduce labor costs subcontract activities to informal enterprises. By their 
superior status in terms of size and capital, formal enterprises are able to impose stringent 
conditions on informal enterprises regarding prices, thus extracting most of the value 
added. … formal enterprises can benefit from the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in terms of labor 
costs in the informal sector, as it directly translates into higher profitability from 
subcontracting.… Formal enterprises pursue […] minimizing costs so that the price of the 
subcontracted activity is as low as possible.” Using formal sector data from the Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI), covering all registered Indian manufacturing establishments for 
the years 1994–1995, 2000–2001 and 2005–2006, and the National Sample Survey (NSS) 
for the informal sector, covering all unregistered manufacturing establishments including 
home-based enterprises with owner as the only worker, they show the link between formal 
sector subcontracting and informal sector employment. Basole et al. (2014) also consider 
subcontracting in Indian manufacturing sector and find that “The fact that relatively less 
endowed firms are more likely to enter into subcontracting relations implies that the 
subcontracting relation might be characterized by asymmetric bargaining firm between the 
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parent and the subcontracted firm.” Maiti and Marjit (2009) estimate the relation between 
formal wage, informal wage, and formal productivity in Indian industry. 
Cohen and Young (2006) provide evidence on in-house production and outsourcing 
to the global economy. As mentioned in Beladi and Mukherjee (2012), “DuPont blends its 
own internal resources with services from more than ten service providers. GMS, a global 
manufacturing and service firm, has moved from centralized and internal to globally 
decentralized with internal and external resources. Nokia purchases a large proportion of 
key electronic components such as semiconductors and microprocessors 
from a global network of suppliers, and at the same time it produces these components in 
its own manufacturing plants (Nokia Annual Report, 2003). Freescale Semiconductor Inc., 
NXP Semiconductors and Analog Device Inc. behave as Integrated Device Manufacturers 
and are also customers of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd, which is a 
semiconductor dedicated foundry.” 
Given the widespread evidence of subcontracting or outsourcing of production, we 
provide a new perspective to the literature on union power and innovation by considering 
subcontracting as a production strategy of the firm. In a model with a monopolist producer, 
thus ignoring the effects shown by Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994 and 1998) in oligopolistic 
markets, we consider that the firm can produce a product in-house by hiring workers from a 
labour union and/or can subcontract production to the informal sector.4 Considering a right-
to-manage5 model of labour union with ex-post bargaining (suggesting no bargaining on 
R&D investment), we show that an increase in union power may either increase or decrease 
the firm’s incentive for innovation. Hence, in contrast to the extant theoretical literature, we 
show that subcontracting of production may be responsible for creating a positive relation 
                                                 
4 It is worth mentioning that subcontracting to the informal sector in our analysis may be interpreted 
alternatively as outsourcing to competitive suppliers in another country with a competitive labour market. 
5 See, Layard et al. (1991) and Connolly et al. (1986) for arguments in favour of the right-to-manage model. 
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between union power and innovation under ex-post right-to-manage firm-union 
bargaining.6 
If the firm produces the product in-house, it faces a labour union but subcontracting 
to the informal sector allows it to avoid the labour union. However, there are diseconomies 
of scale in the informal sector. Further, the benefits from the firm’s innovation may not spill 
over to the informal sector. The firm determines the amount of in-house production and 
subcontracting to balance these effects. If the informal sector does not benefit much from 
the firm’s innovation, the benefit from subcontracting is not significant, and a higher rent 
extraction by the in-house union following an increase in union power reduces the firm’s 
incentive for innovation. However, if the informal sector benefits significantly from the 
firm’s innovation, subcontracting allows the firm to avoid the in-house unionised wage as 
well as to get significant benefits from its innovation. Hence, an increase in union power 
may encourage innovation depending on the market size. 
As shown in the following analysis, an increase in union power increases the firm’s 
profit from subcontracting but it reduces its profit from in-house production. Further, an 
increase in union power increases the profit from subcontracting more under innovation 
compared to no innovation, irrespective of the market size. However, whether an increase 
in union power reduces the profit from in-house production more under innovation 
compared to no innovation depends on the market size. If the market is small (large), the 
loss of profit is higher (lower) under innovation. Hence, an increase in union power 
increases the incentive for innovation in a large market. If the market is small, there are 
opposing effects on the incentive for innovation due to different effects on the in-house 
profit and the profit from subcontracting. We find that the effect on the in-house profit 
                                                 
6 It is worth mentioning that although we consider a firm-union bargaining in our analysis, our results are valid 
for an alternative situation where, instead of workers, a final goods producer needs a key intermediate product. 
In this situation, we need to consider our labour union as a profit maximising intermediate goods supplier with 
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dominates the effect on the profit from subcontracting, and an increase in union power 
reduces the incentive for innovation. 
Our reason for a positive relation between union power and innovation is different 
from the existing empirical literature. It is argued in Schnabel and Wagner (1994) that 
inefficient firm-union bargaining may be responsible for the negative effect of unions on 
innovation in the US studies, and the results may differ for countries with efficient 
bargaining. This is because the efficient bargaining helps to maximise the pie, which the 
firm and union can divide. Addison et al. (2001) argue that a direct association is more 
likely to be observed between works council and product innovation than between works 
council and process innovation, since product innovation may allow the works council to 
extract new rent in the future while process innovation may reduce workforce in the short-
run. However, in our analysis, even if there is a process innovation and no efficient 
bargaining, subcontracting helps the outsourcing firm to avoid the unionised wage, and the 
outsourcing firm may benefit from its innovated technology in the presence of a significant 
knowledge spillover. This benefit from subcontracting may create a positive relation 
between union power and innovation. 
We also show that an increase in union power makes the firm worse off irrespective 
of its effect on innovation. However, in contrast to the usual belief, an increase in union 
power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting innovation, 
thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful. An increase in union power 
may create an ambiguous effect on social welfare. 
There is a literature showing the effects of unions on innovation in general 
equilibrium growth models. Palokangas (1996) considers a situation where innovation 
requires only skilled labour, and the union-employer federation bargains for skilled and 
                                                                                                                                                    
market power and the informal sector as a set of firms, which can produce the intermediate product but do not 
have any market power. 
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unskilled wages. In this framework, the paper shows that higher wages for unskilled 
workers increase innovation. Boone (2000) considers two types of innovation – process 
innovation, which reduces fixed labour costs, and product innovation, which increases 
product-quality – and shows that with a labour market imperfection, which raises wage 
above the shadow price of labour, firms over-invest in process innovation and under-invest 
in product innovation. Palokangas (2004) considers a model with two-sectors – a high-tech 
sector with innovation and firm-union bargaining, and a traditional sector with no 
innovation and no union – and shows that an increase in union power increases innovation.  
Chu et al. (2016) show that an increase in union power creates a positive effect on 
innovation under an employment-oriented union, a negative effect on innovation under a 
wage-oriented union, and a neutral effect on innovation if the union is neither wage nor 
employment oriented. Unlike this literature, we show the effects of strategic subcontracting 
on the relation between union power and innovation. 
Our paper can also be related to a recently growing literature where bi-sourcing, 
suggesting that a firm produces inputs in-house and sources them from outside suppliers,7 
may occur due to input market imperfections (Beladi and Mukherjee, 2012 and Stenbacka 
and Tombak, 2012).8 There is another literature suggesting that the presence of powerful 
unions may encourage firms to locate their plants in countries with no or weak unions 
(Lommerud et al., 2003 and Mukherjee and Suetrong, 2012). However, unlike our paper, 
those literatures do not consider how bi-sourcing, which is affected by the in-house input 
supplier’s bargaining power, affects innovation and welfare. 
                                                 
7 As an empirical evidence of bi-sourcing, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) document that 35% of interstate 
carriers in the USA trucking industry source drivers in-house as well as from external suppliers. The empirical 
work by Bas and Carluccio (2009) show that French multinationals design their organisational structures 
depending on the bargaining power of the firms and trade unions or other input suppliers. 
8 Some other reasons for bi-sourcing are uncertainty in the final goods market (Emons, 1996), moral hazard 
problems (Du et al., 2006, 2009), capacity utilization problem and deadhead loss (He and Nickerson, 2006), 
and internal and external scale constraints and the synergic benefits from different procurement modes 
(Puranam et al., 2013).  
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 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
benchmark model with no subcontracting and shows the effects of an increase in union 
power. Section 3 extends the model with subcontracting and derives the results. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. The benchmark model with no subcontracting 
Assume that there is a monopolist producer, called firm M, producing a product that 
requires only labour. If firm M produces q units of output, it requires q units of labour. We 
assume that firm M can invest an amount F in R&D to reduce the labour coefficient. If firm 
M undertakes R&D, it can produce q units of output by using q units of labour, where 
(0,1) .9 We consider in this section that subcontracting is not an option to firm M. 
There is a labour union that bargains with firm M to determine wage, w, and d is the 
workers’ reservation wages. Demand for the product comes from consumers and the 
inverse market demand function is P=a – Q, where P is price and Q is the total output. Like 
other partial equilibrium analysis, there is no income effect in our analysis. 
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm M decides whether to invest in 
R&D. At stage 2, the labour union and firm M bargain for the unionised wage, w. At stage 
3, firm M determines output and the profits are realised. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
We assume in this section that a d , which will ensure that firm M’s equilibrium 
outputs are positive and the equilibrium wage is not lower than the competitive wage, 
irrespective of firm M’s R&D decision. 
If firm M invests in R&D in stage 1, it maximises the following expression to 
determine its output: 
                                                 
9 We will discuss the implications of continuous R&D investments later. 
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( )
Q
Max a Q w Q  .                          (1) 
The equilibrium output is *
2
a w
Q

 , and it is positive for ( ) 0a w  , which is 
assumed to hold. The labour demand faced by the union is * *L Q . 
If firm M innovates in stage 1, * 0Q   and bargaining between firm M and the 
labour union is successful, the gross profit10 of firm M is 
2( )
4
m
a w


  and utility of the 
union is *( )U w d Q  . However, if bargaining between firm M and the labour union 
breaks down, the profit of firm M is 0m   and union utility is 0U  , since the output of 
firm M is 0. Hence, the unionised wage is determined by maximising the following 
expression: 
 
(1 )
*[( ) ] m m
w
Max w d Q

  

    ,               (2) 
where   (resp. (1 ) ) is bargaining power of the labour union (resp. Firm M). Since the 
cost of innovation is sunk at the stage of wage bargaining, it does not appear in the 
objective function (2). Like many previous papers on labour unions (see, e.g., Grout, 1984, 
Ulph and Ulph, 1989, 1994, Leahy and Montagna, 2000, Mukherjee, 2008, Maiti and 
Mukherjee, 2013 and Saha et al., 2013), we assume that if an union member is not 
employed in firm M, it earns the reservation wage d. 
The equilibrium wage can be found as *
( )
2
a d
w d
 

 
  
 
. Given *w , we get 
that *
(2 )( )
4
a d
Q
  
 , and it is positive for a d , which is assumed to hold. 
Inserting *w  in the profit function, we get that if firm M innovates in stage 1, its net 
profit is 
2 2
* (2 ) ( )
16
m
a d
F F
 

 
   . However, if firm M does not innovate in stage 1, 
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its net profit can be found by considering 1   and 0F  . Hence, if firm M does not 
innovate in stage 1, its net profit is 
2 2
0 (2 ) ( )
16
m
a d

 
 . An increase in union power 
reduces firm M’s profit under both innovation and no innovation. 
Firm M innovates if 
2
* 0 (2 ) (1 )(2 )
16
m m
d a d d
F F
  
 
   
    , where F  
shows firm M’s maximum willingness to invest in R&D. A higher (lower) F  implies that 
firm M’s maximum willingness to invest in R&D increases (decreases), implying that firm 
M’s incentive for innovation increases (decreases). We get that 
(2 )(1 )(2 )
0
8
F d a d d  

    
  

, implying that an increase in union power reduces 
firm M’s incentive for innovation. This is in line with the previous work, such as Grout 
(1984), where an increase in union power reduces the firm’s incentive for innovation by 
increasing rent extraction by the labour union. 
An increase in union power increases the unionised wage and reduces firm M’s 
profit, irrespective of firm M’s R&D decision. However, the rise in wage and the reduction 
in firm M’s profit are more under innovation than no innovation by firm M. Thus, an 
increase in union power reduces firm M’s incentive for innovation.  
The equilibrium union utility and the total equilibrium output are 
2
* (2 )( )
8
a dx
U
  
  and *
(2 )( )
4
a dx
Q
 
  respectively, where x   ( 1x  ) under 
innovation (no innovation) by firm M. An increase in union power increases union utility 
and reduces the total output and therefore, consumer surplus under both innovation and no 
innovation, since the consumer surplus in our analysis is 
2
2
Q
CS  . 
                                                                                                                                                    
10 The gross profit does not exclude the cost of innovation, F.  
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We have shown that an increase in union power increases union utility for a given 
technology but it also reduces the incentive for innovation. Hence, if we internalise the 
effect of an increase in union power on innovation, an increase in union power may create 
an ambiguous effect on union utility. On one hand, an increase in union power tends to 
increase union utility for a given technology by increasing the wage but, on the other hand, 
if an increase in union power reduces innovation, it tends to reduce the profit and therefore, 
the rent that can be extracted by the union, which tends to reduce union utility. The net 
result depends on the relative strengths of these effects. This is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. The effects of an increase in union power on union utility. 
 
The lines GG and HH in Fig. 1 show that, for a given labour coefficient, an increase 
in union power increases union utility. HH corresponds to the labour coefficient 1, while 
GG corresponds to a labour coefficient (0,1) , since innovation increases union utility 
for a given union power. For simplicity, we draw the lines as linear.  
Assume that innovation occurs if the union power is t, and the corresponding union 
utility is F. If the union power increases from t to, say, z, and the higher union power deters 
innovation, union utility is S. Hence, an increase in union power decreases union utility by 
reducing innovation. However, if the union power increases to z , an increase in union 
power increases union utility even if it reduces innovation. 
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 The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. If firm M does not have the option to subcontract output to the informal 
sector, an increase in union power decreases its incentive for innovation, decreases consumer 
surplus and creates an ambiguous effect on union utility. 
 
3. The implications of subcontracting 
Now we extend the model of the previous section by incorporating the possibility of 
subcontracting by firm M. Production requires labour and firm M can produce the product 
either in-house and/or can subcontract production to the informal sector.11 We assume that 
if firm M produces q units of output in-house, it requires q units of labour, but if firm M 
subcontracts q units of output to the informal sector, production in the informal sector 
requires 2q  units of labour. Hence, the cost of producing through subcontracting is 
increasing and convex, which can be due to the organisational or monitoring cost related to 
management and quality control (Shy and Stenbacka, 2005), extra-legal cost and/or search 
cost (Marjit et al. 2007 and Maiti and Marjit, 2008)12. Under subcontracting, firm M needs 
to contact with each supplier in the informal sector separately, which may create 
diseconomies of scale. 
If firm M invests F amount to undertake R&D, it can produce q units of output in-
house by using q units of labour, where (0,1) , but if firm M subcontracts q units of 
                                                 
11 See Ulyssea (2010) and Maiti and Mukherjee (2013) for recent works where the production process 
involves both formal and informal sectors. 
12 Hiring informal workers may not be legal and create regulatory problems for the firms. Firms may avoid the 
problem by offering bribes to the regulators, thus creating an inefficiency. Alternatively, subcontracting to the 
informal sector may involve additional efforts in searching suitable suppliers, setting acceptable informal 
terms and conditions, and monitoring them. 
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output, we assume that production in the informal sector requires 2q  units of labour, 
where 
1
[1, ]

  inversely measures the degree of knowledge spillover.13 
It is well known that subcontracting or outsourcing often creates the need for 
technology transfer from the outsourcing firm to the supplier (UNIDO, 1999). As 
documented in UNIDO (1999), there are several ways technology transfer can occur under 
subcontracting. For example: 
“- Preparation and supply of technical documents: these include machining drawings, 
production manuals, quality control and inspection sheets, process flow-charts, quality 
control flow-charts, list of the required installations, jigs and tools and auxiliary equipment, 
bills of raw materials and components. In case the contract involves also the production 
process, the shop floor lay-out, the list of machinery, tools and ancillary services and 
supplies necessary for the production at the licensee premises are also supplied. 
- Technical assistance and training of the subcontractor personnel on the production 
processes, if the manufacturing cycle is part of the technology transfer. Training schedules 
and each party share of the related personnel costs are also regulated. 
- Machinery and equipment to be procured by the contractor or by the subcontractor, 
according to the former specifications. If the contractor supplies the production equipment 
he may also be involved in the production start up.” 
As discussed in UNIDO (1999), location of the firms may also affect technology 
transfer under subcontracting; a closer location between the outsourcing firm and its 
supplier helps to upgrade the subcontractor’s technological capabilities. Globalisation is 
making developing countries as attractive locations for subcontracting and examples of 
international technology transfer from outsourcing firms to their suppliers can be found in 
Pack and Saggi (2001). As mentioned in Hobday (1995), firms from industrialized 
                                                 
13 We will discuss the implications of continuous R&D investments later. 
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countries often need to transfer their technologies to their suppliers from Asian newly 
industrialized countries.  It is evident from Hou and Gee (1993) that a significant amount of 
technology transfer occurs from developed-country firms to their suppliers from newly 
industrialized countries. Evidences of similar technology transfers can also be found in 
Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2008). 
 As mentioned in Moreno-Monroy et al. (2014), formal enterprises are “… 
maximizing the quality of the subcontracted product, so as not to compromise quality 
standards and … minimizing the risk of vertically disintegrating the production process, so 
as to ensure a timely delivery of the final product. Therefore, formal enterprises take into 
account not only differences in costs between in-house production and subcontracting, but 
also the productive and technological capacity of potential suppliers (Wattanapruttipaisan 
[2002]).” 
Technology transfer under subcontracting allows the subcontractor to benefit from 
the innovated technology. We capture the extent of knowledge spillover (or technology 
transfer) from firm M to the subcontractor by 
1
[1, ]

 , where 
1


  implies no 
knowledge spillover and 1   implies complete technology transfer. Knowledge spillover 
is incomplete for 
1
(1, )

 . 
There is a labour union which bargains with firm M to determine firm M’s in-house 
wage, w, while considering the competitive wage, d, as the unionised workers’ reservation 
wages. The competitive wage prevails in the informal sector, thus creating different labour 
market institutions in the formal and informal sectors. Hence, subcontracting will allow the 
firm to avoid a higher in-house wage. This is in line with many other papers considering 
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subcontracting (see, e.g., Marjit, 2003, Marjit et al. 2007, Maiti and Marjit, 2008, 2009, 
Maiti and Mukherjee, 2013 and Saha et al., 2014).14 
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm M decides whether to invest in 
R&D. At stage 2, the labour union and firm M bargain for the unionised wage, w. At stage 
3, firm M determines the amount of output to be produced in-house and the amount of 
output to be subcontracted, and the profits are realised. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
We assume in this section that 
1
( )a d

  , which will ensure that firm M’s in-
house production will be positive and the equilibrium unionised wage will not be less than 
the competitive wage, irrespective of firm M’s R&D decision. 
If firm M invests in R&D, it maximises the following expression to determine the 
in-house production, q, and the amount of subcontracting, k, where Q k q  : 
2
,
( ) ( )
q k
Max a q k w q a q k k dk F         .             (3) 
The equilibrium in-house production is *
2
ad w dw
q
d
 

 
 , which creates the in-house 
labour demand as * *L q . The in-house production is positive if ( ) 0ad w dw    , 
which is assumed to hold. The equilibrium amount of subcontracting is *
2
w
k
d
 . A 
higher in-house wage increases the amount of subcontracting. 
Since the marginal cost of informal production is increasing from zero and the 
marginal cost of in-house production is constant and positive, the amount of subcontracting 
is determined by the equality of the marginal cost of in-house production, i.e., w , and the 
marginal cost of informal production, i.e., 2dk . The total output, i.e., 
                                                 
14 As already mentioned, in our analysis, outsourcing to competitive suppliers in another country with a 
competitive labour market may be an alternative interpretation to subcontracting. 
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2
a w
Q q k

   , is determined by the equality of the marginal revenue, i.e., 2a Q , and 
the marginal cost of in-house production, i.e., w . 
The equilibrium is shown in Fig. 2. DD and DM show the demand curve and the 
marginal revenue, and 0AEC is the marginal cost. The line 0A is the marginal cost of 
informal production and the line AEC shows the marginal cost of in-house production, 
which is determined by the firm-union bargaining. The total equilibrium output (i.e., 
Q k q  ) is given by the intersection of DM and 0AEC, where 0k is the amount of 
subcontracting and kQ is the amount of in-house production. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The equilibrium output. 
 
Given * 0q   and * 0k  , if bargaining between firm M and the labour union is 
successful, the gross profit of firm M is 
2 22 (1 )
4
m
a d adw w d
d
   


  
  and union 
utility is *( )U w d q  . However, if bargaining between firm M and the labour union 
breaks down, the gross profit of firm M is 
2
4(1 )
m
a
d




,15 and union utility is 0U  , 
                                                 
15 If bargaining between firm M and the labour union is unsuccessful, firm M subcontracts to maximise 
2( )a k k dk  , which gives 
2
4(1 )
m
a
d




.  
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since * 0q  . Hence, the equilibrium in-house wage is determined by maximising the 
following expression: 
 
(1 )
*[( ) ] m m
w
Max w d q

  

    .               (4) 
The equilibrium wage can be found as *
2
2 1
2
d a
w
d


 
  
       
. We get that 
*w d  for 
1
( )a d

  , which holds by assumption. We find that an increase in union 
power (i.e., a higher  ) increases the unionised wage, *w . 
Given *w , we get that *
(2 )[ (1 )]
4
a d
q
  

  
 , which is positive for 
(1 )d
a



 , and the equilibrium amount of subcontracting is *
1 (2 )
4 1
a
k
d
 
 
 
  
 
. 
The total output is  * *
1 1
2 2 1
4 1
d ak
d
q   

   
        
  


 . An increase in 
union power increases subcontracting, and decreases in-house production and the total 
output. Further, the amount of subcontracting increases with more knowledge spillover 
(i.e., with a lower  ). 
Given the equilibrium values of k, w and q, we get the equilibrium net profit of firm 
M under innovation as  
2 2 2
* [4 (2 ) ] d(1 d )(2 ) [(1 ) 2 ]
16 (1 )
a d d a
F F
d
        

 
      
  

. (5) 
 If firm M does not innovate, the equilibrium values can be found by considering 
1  , 1   and 0F  in (5). Hence, if firm M does not innovate, *
(2 )( 1 )
4
a d
q
  
  
and it is positive for (1 )a d  , which is assumed to hold. Under no innovation by firm M, 
* 1 ( 1 )
2 4(1 )
a d
k
d
  
  
 
 and the profit of firm M is 
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2 2 2
0 [4 (2 ) ] (2 ) (1 )(1 2 )
16(1 )
a d d d d a
d
 

      


.            (6) 
 The above discussion gives the following result immediately. 
 
Proposition 2. If 
1
( )a d

  , we get *w d , * 0k   and * 0q  , i.e., firm M’s in-house 
production and subcontracting to the informal sector are positive, irrespective of firm M’s 
R&D decision. 
 
3.1. The effects of an increase in union power on innovation 
Firm M innovates if * 0F    or 
2 2 2 2
2(1 )(4 ) (2 ) [ ( 1 ( 1 ))]2a(2 ) (1 )
16 (1 )(1 )
d a d
F F
d d
      
 
 
        
      
  
.  
         (7) 
 We find that 
   
  
   
2 2
2
2 1
1 2 1 1
8 1 1
d a
a d
F
d d

 
 
 

  
       





, 
which shows the effects of an increase in union power on firm M’s incentive for innovation. 
We also find that 0
F


 
 
  

, suggesting that as knowledge spillover increases (i.e.,   
decreases), it increases the rate at which firm M’s incentive for innovation changes with 
respect to union power. 
 
Proposition 3. Assume 1   (i.e., knowledge spills over completely), and (1 )a d   so 
that * 0q   and * 0k  . An increase in union power decreases firm M’s incentive for 
innovation (i.e., 0
F




) for 2((1 ),(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ))a d d d d d d          but it 
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increases firm M’s incentive for innovation (i.e., 0
F




) for 
2(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )a d d d d d        . 
Proof. If 1  , we find that 
(2 )(1 )
1 2
8 (1 )(1 )
F d a
d d a
d d
 

 
    
      
    
, 
F



 is convex and 0
F




 at 2[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )]a d d d d d         and 
2[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )]a d d d d d        , where 
2[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )] (1 d)d d d d d         . Hence, 0
F




 for 
2((1 ),(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ))a d d d d d d          but 0
F




 for 
2(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )a d d d d d        . □ 
 
 In the presence of subcontracting, firm M’s profits depend on both in-house 
production and subcontracting. An increase in union power increases the unionised wage 
even in the presence of subcontracting but its effect on innovation is different from the one 
shown in the previous section, where subcontracting is not an option to firm M. 
If (1 )a d  , an increase in union power increases the amount of subcontracting 
and firm M’s profit from subcontracting (i.e., 0
OUT




, where 
* * * *2[( ) ]OUT a q k k dk     ). This increase in profit is higher under innovation 
compared to no innovation (i.e., 
( 1) ( 1)
0
OUT OUT   
 
   
 
 
). Thus, an increase in 
union power tends to increase firm M’s incentive for innovation through its effect on the 
profit from subcontracting. 
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Now consider the effect on firm M’s in-house production. If (1 )a d  , an increase 
in union power decreases firm M’s profit from in-house production (i.e., 0
IH




, where 
* * *[( ) ]IH a q k w q     ). However, the effect of innovation on the loss of in-house 
profit (i.e., 
( 1) ( 1)IH IH   
 
   

 
) following an increase in union power is convex 
with respect to the market size, a. If the market is small (i.e., (1 )a d  ), the loss of in-
house profit is higher under innovation (i.e., 
( 1) ( 1)
0
IH IH   
 
   
 
 
) but if the 
market is large (i.e., 2(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )a d d d d d        ), the loss is lower under 
innovation (i.e., 
( 1) ( 1)
0
IH IH   
 
   
 
 
). Hence, an increase in union power tends 
to decrease (increase) firm M’s incentive for innovation in a small (large) market through 
its effect on the in-house profit. The non-monotonic relation occurs due to different effects 
on the in-house production, *q , and the per-unit profit from in-house production, 
* *( )a q k w   . Innovation (compared to no innovation) reduces in-house production 
more following an increase in union power, but it creates an ambiguous effect on the 
reduction of the per-unit in-house profit following an increase in union power, thus creating 
the non-monotonic effect. The ambiguity on the reduction of the per-unit in-house profit is 
due to the ambiguous effect on the total output, which is due to the opposing effects on the 
in-house production and the amount of subcontracting. 
Whether an increase in union power increases or decreases firm M’s incentive for 
innovation depends on its effects on firm M’s profits from in-house production and 
subcontracting. If the market is large, an increase in union power creates beneficial effects 
on innovation compared to no innovation through its effects on firm M’s profits from in-
house production and subcontracting. Hence, in a large market, an increase in union power 
 21 
increases firm M’s incentive for innovation. However, if the market is small, an increase in 
union power creates opposing effects on innovation compared to no innovation through its 
effects on firm M’s profits from in-house production and subcontracting. In this situation, 
the effect on the in-house profit dominates the effect on the profit from subcontracting, and 
an increase in union power decreases firm M’s incentive for innovation. 
 Next, consider the case of no knowledge spillover. 
 
Proposition 4. Assume 
1


  (i.e., knowledge does not spill over), and 
1
( )a d

   so 
that *w d , * 0q   and * 0k  . An increase in union power decreases firm M’s incentive 
for innovation. 
Proof. If 
1


 , we find that 
  2 1 [( 1 ) ( )]
0
8
d a d dF a  

       

 , which 
proves the result. □ 
 
 Proposition 4 contrasts with Proposition 3 and shows that if the benefit from the 
innovated technology does not spill over to the informal sector, an increase in union power 
reduces firm M’s incentive for innovation even if it subcontracts to the informal sector. 
Although an increase in union power increases the amount of subcontracting and firm M’s 
profit from subcontracting, the gain from subcontracting is not large enough to outweigh 
firm M’s loss of profit from in-house production because subcontracting induces firm M to 
sacrifice the benefit from its innovated technology. 
Since 0
F


 
 
  

 for 
1
[1, ]

 , it is immediate from Propositions 3 and 4 that if 
knowledge spillover is significantly large, an increase in union power increases firm M’s 
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incentive for innovation. If we consider 
1
[1, ]

 , we get that 0
F




, i.e., an increase in 
union power increases the incentive for innovation, for 
           
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
d d d d d d
a
      
 
         

 . Note that this 
condition cannot occur for 
1


 , thus confirming Proposition 4. However, if 1  , this 
condition becomes 2(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )a d d d d d        , as shown in Proposition 3. 
The difference created by subcontracting on the relation between union power and 
innovation can be explained in the following way. If there is no subcontracting, firm M’s 
default option is no production if the wage bargaining breaks down. In this situation, an 
increase in union power decreases firm M’s incentive for innovation by allowing the union 
to extract a significantly large return from innovation. However, the presence of 
subcontracting allows firm M to avoid the union power and the benefit from subcontracting 
increases if firm M’s innovated technology can increase production efficiency in the 
informal sector. If knowledge spillover about firm M’s innovated technology is significant, 
the benefit from subcontracting is significantly large to outweigh firm M’s in-house profit 
loss following a rise in union power. In this situation, an increase in union power increases 
firm M’s incentive for innovation. However, if knowledge spillover is not significant, firm 
M can avoid the union power by subcontracting but it also needs to sacrifice a large benefit 
from the innovated technology, and an increase in union power decreases firm M’s 
incentive for innovation. 
 
3.2. The effects of an increase in union power on the profit of firm M 
The net profits of firm M under innovation and no innovation are shown in (5) and 
(6) respectively. We get that an increase in union power reduces both *( )F   and 0  , 
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i.e., if firm M either innovates or does not innovate irrespective of the union power, an 
increase in union power reduces its profit. 
 If an increase in union power decreases firm M’s innovation, it decreases the profit 
of firm M. This happens since, on one hand, an increase in union power tends to reduce the 
profit of firm M for a given technology by increasing the unionised wage, and on the other 
hand, it tends to reduce firm M’s profit by decreasing innovation. 
Now consider the situation where an increase in union power increases innovation. 
Assume that innovation does not occur if the union power is t, i.e., ( )F t F . The profit of 
firm M in this situation is 0 ( )t . If the union power increases from t to, say, z, and the 
higher union power induces innovation, which occurs for ( ) (z)F t F F  , the net profit of 
firm M is *( (z) )F  . Subtracting *( (z) )F   from 0 ( )t  and evaluating this difference at 
( )F t , we get that * 0( ( ) ) ( )z F t   , suggesting that the net profit of firm M is lower 
under an increase in union power. 
For a given technology, an increase in union power increases the unionised wage 
and tends to reduce the profit of firm M. Even if an increase in union power increases 
production efficiency by inducing innovation, the wage effect is stronger than the 
production efficiency effect, thus making firm M worse off under an increase in union 
power. 
 The following result summarises the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 5. An increase in union power reduces the profit of firm M, irrespective of its 
effect on innovation. 
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3.3. The effects of an increase in union power on consumer surplus 
Since consumer surplus in our analysis is 
* * 2( )
2
q k
, we look at the effects of an 
increase in union power on the total output. If an increase in union power does not affect 
innovation, i.e., if firm M either innovates or does not innovate irrespective of the union 
power, an increase in union power decreases the total output by increasing the unionised 
wage, thus reducing consumer surplus.16 
 An increase in union power also reduces consumer surplus if it reduces innovation. 
On one hand, an increase in union power tends to increase the unionised wage for a given 
technology, and on the other hand, it reduces production efficiency by reducing innovation. 
Both the effects reduce the total output and consumer surplus for an increase in union 
power. 
Now consider the case where an increase in union power increases innovation. An 
increase in union power tends to reduce the total output by increasing the unionised wage 
for a given labour coefficient. However, if an increase in union power induces innovation, it 
tends to increase the total output by increasing production efficiency. If the latter effect is 
stronger than the former, an increase in union power increases the total output and 
consumer surplus. We show this in Fig. 3.  
 As discussed above, an increase in union power reduces the total output for a given 
technology. We also find that, for a given  , the total output increases with a lower  , i.e., 
 
*
2
*
(2 )
4
( )
0
1
d a
d
q k 

 
 
 
 
 

 
  
 . 
                                                 
16 We get that 
 * * 1
4
0
(1
)
)
( d
d
q k a d

  

  

 
 

. 
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Fig. 3. The effects of an increase in union power on the total output. 
 
The lines AA and BB in Fig. 3 show how an increase in union power affects the total 
output. BB corresponds to the labour coefficient 1, while AA corresponds to a labour 
coefficient (0,1) . For simplicity, we draw the lines as linear and consider 1   so that 
an increase in union power increases the incentive for innovation. Consider a union power 
t. Assume that innovation does not occur if the union power is t, which happens for 
( )F t F . The corresponding total output is G. If the union power increases from t to, say, 
z, and the higher union power induces innovation, which occurs for ( ) (z)F t F F  , the 
total output is H. Hence, an increase in union power increases the total output and consumer 
surplus by inducing innovation. If the initial union power is t and innovation does not occur 
at this union power, a union power higher than t increases consumers surplus if the higher 
union power is less than t  and innovation occurs at the higher union power. 
 The following result is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 6. An increase in union power may increase the total output and consumer 
surplus if it increases innovation. 
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3.4. The effects of an increase in union power on union utility 
Now consider the effects of an increase in union power on union utility. For a given 
labour coefficient, union utility is 
   
 
2
2 1
8 1
d a d
d
U
   
 
  

 , which increases with a 
higher  .17 Hence, if firm M either innovates or does not innovate irrespective of the union 
power, an increase in union power increases union utility. 
Now we want to show in Fig. 4 that if an increase in union power affects 
innovation, it may reduce union utility. 
 
Fig. 4. The effects of an increase in union power on union utility. 
 
The lines SS and YY in Fig. 4 show how an increase in union power affects union 
utility. SS corresponds to the labour coefficient 1, while YY corresponds to a labour 
coefficient (0,1) . For simplicity, we draw the lines as linear and consider 1   so that 
an increase in union power increases the incentive for innovation. As shown above, for a 
given labour coefficient, an increase in union power increases union utility, thus making 
both SS and YY positively sloped. However, whether SS will be higher or lower than YY is 
                                                 
17 We have 
  
 
2
1
0
1
4 1
d
d
U a d  


 
  


 

.  
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not immediate, since 
      
 
2
2 1 1 1 2
8 1
( 1) ( )0
d a d a dU d
d
 

  

       


  

 
for   1 1 2d da     (   1 21 1( )d a d d     ). To show our point, we consider 
(1 )(1 2 )a d d     in Figure 4, implying that 0
U




 , which means that SS is at a 
higher level than YY. 
Assume that innovation does not occur if the union power is t, which occurs for 
( )F t F . The corresponding union utility is E. If the union power increases from t to, say, 
z, and the higher union power induces innovation, which occurs for ( ) ( )F t F F z  , union 
utility is N. Hence, an increase in union power decreases union utility by inducing 
innovation. However, if the union power increases to z  and the higher union power 
induces innovation, i.e., ( ) ( )F t F F z  , an increase in union power increases union 
utility even if it induces innovation. Thus, it suggests that a marginal increase in the union 
power that induces innovation reduces union utility, but a discrete increase in the union 
power may increase union utility even if it induces innovation. However, how much rise in 
the union power is required to increase union utility when the higher union power induces 
innovation depends on the reduction in labour coefficient through innovation (i.e., on  ), 
since a relatively higher (lower)   decreases (increases) the gap between SS and YY, and 
the required rise in the union power is less (more).   
On one hand, for a given labour coefficient, an increase in union power tends to 
increase union utility by increasing the unionised wage, although it increases 
subcontracting. However, if an increase in union power also reduces labour coefficient by 
inducing innovation, our result suggests that this loss of labour coefficient along with a 
higher amount of subcontracting may outweigh the effects of the higher unionised wage, 
thus creating a lower union utility following an increase in union power. 
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 The following result is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 7. An increase in union power may decrease union utility by affecting firm M’s 
innovation decision. 
 
 Like the existing literature, we assumed an exogenously given union power and 
showed that an increase in union power may reduce union utility. It is then natural to ask 
whether, given the choice, the union will always prefer an increase in union power. In our 
framework, the union will certainly prefer to increase its power if the union power does not 
affect firm M’s R&D decision, i.e., if firm M either innovates or does not innovate 
irrespective of the union power. However, the union may prefer a relatively lower power if 
an increase in union power affects innovation, as shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. The incentive for reducing the union power. 
 
Fig. 5, which is like Fig. 4, shows that if an increase in union power induces 
innovation, the union may prefer a lower union power. Like Fig. 4, we assume in Fig. 5 that 
0
U




, implying that SS, which corresponds to the labour coefficient 1, is at a higher level 
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than YY, which corresponds to a labour coefficient (0,1) . Assume that innovation does 
not occur if the union power is t  but it occurs if the union power is between t  and 1. 
Following the discussion on Figure 4, it is immediate that if the union power increases from 
t , union utility falls from E , which is union utility corresponding to the union power t . 
Hence, the union does not prefer power more than t . 
Two observations deserve attention at this point. The result that the union may 
prefer a relatively lower power occurs since the union affects the firm’s R&D decision 
through its choice of union power. However, if the union cannot commit to its power before 
the firm’s R&D decision and the union’s choice is made at the wage bargaining stage, 
which is after the firm’s R&D decision, the union will not be able to affect the firm’s R&D 
decision, and will always prefer to exercise its maximum power. Secondly, even if the 
union can affect the firm’s R&D decision through its choice of union power, as considered 
in our analysis, it may always prefer to exercise its maximum power for the reasons not 
included in our analysis, such as member discontent for not using all its power. 
 Due to the results in Subsections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, it is now immediate that an 
increase in union power may either increase or decrease social welfare, which is the sum of 
profit, consumer surplus and union utility. 
 
3.5. Extensions 
We have considered a framework where firm M decides the amount of in-house 
production and subcontracting at the same time, and the production through subcontracting 
is characterised by diseconomies of scale. It may worth noting that the results of this paper 
hold even if firm M takes a sequential decision on in-house production and subcontracting, 
and the production through subcontracting is not characterised by diseconomies of scale. 
We show this in our working paper Beladi and Mukherjee (2015). 
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 Following Creane and Davidson (2004), Mukherjee (2008) and Maiti and 
Mukherjee (2013), where firms stagger output decisions among different plants, we 
consider in Beladi and Mukherjee (2015) that firm M can stagger output decision among in-
house production and subcontracting. More particularly, we consider the game structure 
where firm M first takes the decision on R&D, which is followed by its decision on 
subcontracting, wage determination by the union and firm M’s decision on in-house 
production. We discuss in our working paper that if firm M decides sequentially on in-
house production and subcontracting, it is beneficial for it to determine the amount of 
subcontracting before dealing with the in-house labour union and determining the amount 
of in-house production. If firm M deals with the in-house labour union before 
subcontracting, it would be able to reduce the union wage up to the effective unit cost of 
informal production. However, firm M can reduce the union wage below the effective unit 
cost of informal production by subcontracting production before bargaining with the in-
house labour union. 
 Considering a linear demand function, we have shown that an increase in union 
power increases subcontracting, and decreases in-house production and the total output. 
Further, the amount of subcontracting increases with more knowledge spillover. These 
effects play important roles in our analysis to create the ambiguous relationship between 
union power and innovation. We show in Appendix A that the effects of an increase in 
union power on subcontracting, in-house production and total output shown under a linear 
demand function remain under a general demand function. 
In Proposition 3 and 4, we have considered a binary R&D process, where firm M 
either invests or does not invest in R&D. We show in Appendix B that the qualitative results 
shown in Propositions 3 and 4 hold even if the R&D investment is continuous. In this 
respect, we consider an uncertain R&D, where a higher R&D investment helps to increase 
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the probability of success in R&D, and a deterministic R&D, where a higher R&D 
investment helps to reduce the labour coefficient more. 
    
4. Conclusion 
Although it is empirically observed that an increase in union power creates an 
ambiguous effect on innovation, the right-to-manage model of labour union could not 
explain this phenomenon while considering ex-post bargaining, where bargaining does not 
occur over R&D investment. We fill this gap in the literature. 
Considering a right-to-manage model of labour union and ex-post bargaining, we 
show that an increase in union power may either increase or decrease a firm’s incentive for 
innovation in the presence of subcontracting, which is an empirically observed phenomenon 
in today’s world. We also show that an increase in union power makes the firm worse off 
irrespective of its effects on innovation. However, in contrast to the usual belief, an increase 
in union power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting 
innovation, thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful. An increase in 
union power may either increase or decrease social welfare. 
 We have considered a situation where a firm, when taking the R&D decision, is 
internalising the effects of innovation on the unionised wage. In other words, we have 
assumed that the union can adjust wage following innovation. Although, following the 
tradition of the literature mentioned in the introduction, we have considered one-time firm-
union interaction, our results will hold even if the firm and union interact in multiple 
periods but the union can adjust wage in every period following innovation. However, there 
may be situations where it may not be economically viable to adjust wage in every period 
following innovation. In those periods, the innovating firm takes the R&D decision based 
on a pre-negotiated wage. If the union cannot extract more rent by changing the wage 
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following innovation, the adverse effects of an increase in union power on innovation are 
expected to be less compared to the situation where wage can be adjusted after innovation. 
Hence, an interesting extension of this paper will be to consider a dynamic analysis with 
multi-period firm-union interactions with multiple innovations where the union can adjust 
wages in some periods but not in all periods. In this situation, the innovating firm needs to 
internalise not only the effects of current wage but also the effects of future wages. We 
leave this issue for future research. 
Following the tradition of the literature mentioned in the introduction, we have 
considered the effects of an increase in union power on a labour-saving or process 
innovation. However, it is often found that firms invest large amounts on product innovation 
(Imai, 1992, Mansfield, 1988 and Pavitt et al., 1987). It must be noted that considering 
product innovation is not a trivial extension of our paper, since the effects of innovation on 
the labour demand function are different under process and product innovations. While a 
process innovation reduces labour demand for a given output, a product innovation increases 
labour demand by increasing the number of products. Hence, a natural extension of this 
paper would be to see how an increase in union power affects the incentive for product 
innovation and the market outcomes in the presence of subcontracting. In this respect, the 
demand function, capturing consumer’s preference for more varieties, may play an important 
role.18 
 Like many other notable contributions (see, e.g., Ulph and Ulph, 1989, 1994 and 
Menezes-Filho et al., 1998), we have considered a linear demand function – a mostly used 
demand function in the Industrial Organisation literature – to show that the presence of 
subcontracting may explain the ambiguous relation between union power and process 
innovation that is unexplained so far in a right-to-manage model of labour union with ex-
                                                 
18 See Bowley (1924) and Shubik and Levitan (1980) for demand functions capturing “love for variety” and 
“no love for variety” respectively. 
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post bargaining. Our results hold even for those non-linear demand functions which can be 
approximated as linear functions around the equilibrium values. We have also discussed in 
Appendix A that the effects of an increase in union power on subcontracting, in-house 
production and the total output shown under a linear demand function remain under a 
general demand function. A possible future research would be to analyse the effects of 
different demand and cost structures on the relation between union power and innovation in 
the presence of subcontracting. In this respect, one may also want to look at the effects on 
process and product innovations, and the effects of different preference functions for 
varieties affecting demand functions. 
 Finally, we showed that the presence of subcontracting may explain the ambiguous 
relationship between union power and innovation under a right-to-manage firm-union 
bargaining. However, if there is an efficient bargaining where the firm and union bargain 
over wage and employment, the bargaining process tends to reduce distortion due to the 
union’s rent-seeking motive (Schnabel and Wagner, 1994). Hence, it is expected that if the 
firm-union bargaining is efficient, an increase in union power is likely to increase the 
possibility of a positive relationship between union power and innovation. Since this issue 
deserves a detailed analysis, we leave it for future research. 
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Appendix A. 
A general demand function. We show in this Appendix that the effects of an increase in 
union power on subcontracting, in-house production and total output shown under a linear 
demand function remain under a general demand function. 
 Assume that the market demand function is ( )P q k  with 0P  , where q is the 
amount of in-house production and k is the amount of subcontracting. Given R&D and the 
unionised wage, firm M maximises the following expression to determine q and k: 
 2
,
[ ( ) ] ( )
q k
Max P q k w q P q k k dk F       .               (8) 
The first order conditions of maximisation are: 
 0P w P q P k                         (9) 
 2 0P q P P k dk     .                (10)  
We assume that the second order conditions hold. 
We get the equilibrium values as: 
*
2
P w w
q
P d



 

, *
2
w
k
d
  and * *
P w
q k
P

 

.            (11)  
We get that * 0k   and consider that the parameter values are such that * 0q  . 
It follows from (9)-(11) and the second order conditions of the above maximisation 
problem that, as w increases, it reduces *q  and * *( )q k , but increases *k . Hence, an 
increase in union power that increases the in-house unionised wage, increases the amount of 
subcontracting, and reduces in-house production and the total output. Further, it follows 
from (11) that as the degree of knowledge spillover increases (i.e.,   falls), it increases the 
amount of subcontracting. 
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Appendix B. 
Continuous R&D investment. We considered in the text that firm M either invests in R&D 
or does not invest in R&D. Hence, we considered a binary decision on the R&D investment. 
We find that an increase in union power increases (decreases) firm M’s incentive for 
innovation if it increases (decreases) F  or the difference * 0   with respect to union 
power,  . It is easy to understand that a similar condition is required even if we consider the 
following R&D process with a continuous R&D investment. 
 Assume that success in R&D is uncertain and firm M can invest more in R&D to 
increase the probability of success in R&D. Assume that the probability of success in R&D 
is ( )p F  with ( ) 0p F   and ( ) 0p F  . Hence, firm M determines the amount of R&D 
investment, F, to maximise its expected profit * 0( ) (1 ( ))E p F p F F      . The 
equilibrium R&D investment is determined by 0E   or * 0( )( ) 1 0p F       with 
0E  . Hence, an increase in union power increases (decreases) the equilibrium R&D 
investment if 
* 0( )
( )0
 

 
 

. This is for the following reason. If * 0   increases 
(decreases) with respect to  , it increases (decreases) the expected marginal profit from 
R&D, which is * 0( )( ) 1p F     , for a given R&D investment and therefore, encouraging 
firm M to investment more (less) in R&D following an increase in union power.19 
 Next, we consider another type of R&D process with a continuous R&D investment 
to show that an increase in union power may increase or decrease the R&D investment. 
Assume that success in R&D is certain and a higher investment in R&D allows firm M to 
achieve a greater reduction in labour coefficient. More specifically, assume that if firm M 
invests F amount in R&D, it incurs a cost 
2
( )
2
F
C F  , but it can reduce the labour 
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coefficient from 1 to (1 )F  with (1 ) 0F  . With this R&D process, the equilibrium profit 
of firm M at stage 1, i.e., at the R&D stage, is 
2 2
2 2
*
(1 )[4 (1 )(2 ) ]
d[1 d (1 )](2 ) (1 )[{1 (1 )}(1 F) 2 (1 )]
( )
16 (1 )[1 (1 )] 2
a F d F
F F d F a F F
C F
F d F
  
   

 
   
         
  
  
. 
 The equilibrium R&D investment is given by: 
  
           
 
  
2
* * 2 2
2 2
2
*
2 1 2 1 1 1 2
2
1 0
16 1 1
a d F d F a
d
a
d F
     
 
 
            
 
    
   
,   (12) 
where *F  is the equilibrium R&D investment. Assume that the second order condition of 
maximization is satisfied. 
Left hand side (LHS) of (12) shows the marginal profit from R&D. If LHS of (12) 
increases with respect to  , an increase in union power increases (decreases) the marginal 
profit from R&D for a given R&D investment and therefore, encourages (discourages) firm 
M to invest more in R&D. 
We get that LHS of (12) increases (decreases) with respect to   if 
        * * *1 1 1 1 3 2 1 ( )0a d F a d F d F                .         (13) 
Under the assumption of 
1
( )a d

  , which ensures *w d , * 0q   and * 0k  , we get that 
  *1 1 0a d F      . Hence, LHS of (13) is positive (negative) for 
     * *1 1 3 2 1 ( )0a d F d F           or 
    * *1 1 3 2 1d F d
a
F 

   
 . 
If, e.g., 1  , i.e., there is complete knowledge spillover, LHS of (13) is positive (negative) 
                                                                                                                                                    
19 Following the same procedure, it can be shown that if there is no possibility of subcontracting, as 
considered in the benchmark model, an increase in union power decreases investment in innovation. 
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for    * *( ) 1 1 1 2 1d F da F          , which implies like Proposition 3 that an increase 
in union power increases (decreases) innovation if the market is sufficiently large (small). 
Following the same procedure, it can be shown that if there is no possibility of 
subcontracting, as considered in the benchmark model, an increase in union power decreases 
investment in innovation. In this situation, firm M maximizes  
2 2 2
* (2 ) ( (1 ))( )
16 2
m
a d F F
C F


  
    to determine the R&D investment. The 
equilibrium R&D investment is 
   
 
2
*
22
2
8 2
a d d
F
d


 

 
. We get that 
   
  
2
2
*
2
16 2
0
8 2
F a d d
d


  

 

 . 
 Thus, we show that the results shown in the text regarding the relation between union 
power and innovation under a binary R&D investment decision remain under continuous 
R&D investments. In this respect, we consider an uncertain R&D, where a higher R&D 
investment helps to increase the probability of success in R&D, and a deterministic R&D, 
where a higher R&D investment helps to reduce the labour coefficient more. 
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